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The United States has offered free worldwide position, navigation, and timing (PNT) 
broadcast data through the Global Positioning System (GPS) since its 1993 initial 
operations capable declaration, and periodic modernization efforts have been made 
throughout its 20-year history. A planned modernized L5 “safety of life” GPS signal, 
combined with the current GPS-enabled device ubiquity, offers an unprecedented 
opportunity to embed and broadcast other non-PNT information into GPS signals and 
reach individuals on a global scale with information in new ways. Adequate additional 
bandwidth exists in the new L5 “safety of life” signal to embed notification information 
for worldwide natural and technological disasters and add a new communication medium 
for a possible global disaster notification system. This thesis explores the background, 
requirements, system design and U.S. policy of a disaster-notification enabled GPS L5 
“safety of life” signal.   
 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
II.  BACKGROUND ..........................................................................................................3 
A.  EXISTING DISASTER NOTIFICATION SYSTEMS ................................3 
B.  DISASTER STATISTICS ...............................................................................5 
C.  GPS-ENABLED SMARTPHONE USE .......................................................11 
D.  AN IDEAL WARNING SYSTEM ...............................................................12 
E.  GPS BACKGROUND ...................................................................................15 
1.  System Overview ................................................................................15 
2.  Signals and Modernization................................................................17 
III.  GPS DNMS .................................................................................................................21 
A.  DNMS REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................21 
1.  Trigger Criteria and Global Event Support ....................................22 
2.  Timeliness ...........................................................................................24 
3.  Event Location and Size ....................................................................25 
4.  Simultaneous Satellite Overlap .........................................................26 
5.  Message Reporting Interval ..............................................................27 
B.  DNMS ASSUMPTIONS ................................................................................27 
C.  DNMS SPACE SEGMENT ...........................................................................28 
1.  L5 Bandwidth Analysis .....................................................................28 
2.  Transmission Scheme ........................................................................32 
3.  DNMS Message Data Structure ........................................................34 
D.  DNMS CONTROL SEGMENT ...................................................................46 
E.  DNMS USER SEGMENT .............................................................................48 
F.  ADDITIONAL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS ..........................................48 
1.  Interference ........................................................................................48 
2.  Additional Modernized GPS Signals ................................................51 
3.  Commercialization of DNMS Data ...................................................52 
4.  WAAS..................................................................................................53 
5.  GPS Emergency Messaging System Patents ....................................54 
IV.  GPS POLICY .............................................................................................................57 
V.  CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................59 
VI.  RECOMMENDED AREAS OF FURTHER STUDY ............................................61 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................63 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.  Natural Disaster Statistical Summary 1900–2011 (From CRED) .....................6 
Figure 2.  Reported Natural Disaster Event Types 1900–2011 (From CRED) ..................8 
Figure 3.  Technological Disaster Statistics 1900–2011 (From CRED) ............................9 
Figure 4.  Natural Disaster Geographic Distribution 2011 (From Guha-Sapir et. al.) .....10 
Figure 5.  Generalized National Level Notification System ............................................13 
Figure 6.  Generalized Expanded Notification System ....................................................14 
Figure 7.  Control Segment Infrastructure ........................................................................16 
Figure 8.  GPS Frequency and Broadcast Signals ............................................................18 
Figure 9.  L5 Bandwidth Simulation ................................................................................31 
Figure 10.  L5 Message Type 15 - Text Message (From ICD-GPS-705C) .......................35 
Figure 11.  Proposed L5 Message Type 44 - DNMS Message ..........................................35 
Figure 12.  DNMS Shape Ratio Examples .........................................................................40 
Figure 13.  DNMS Shape Direction Example ....................................................................41 
Figure 14.  Refined L5 Message Type 44–DNMS Message ..............................................45 
Figure 15.  Overlapping Event Example (Shape, Ratio, Direction) ...................................46 
Figure 16.  DNMS Control Segment Information Flow ....................................................47 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.  Current and Future GPS Broadcast Types .......................................................17 
Table 2.  GPS Block Constellation Size (From Shaw) ...................................................18 
Table 3.  DNMS Requirements .......................................................................................22 
Table 4.  L5 Message Broadcast Intervals ......................................................................29 
Table 5.  ETYPE - DNMS Message Event Type ............................................................37 
Table 6.  PREC–DNMS Message Event Precedence .....................................................37 
Table 7.  SIZE - DNMS Message Event Size .................................................................39 
Table 8.  SHP–DNMS Message Event Shape.................................................................39 
Table 9.  RAT–DNMS Message Event Shape Ratio ......................................................40 
Table 10.  DIR - DNMS Message Event Shape Direction ................................................41 
Table 11.  DUR–DNMS Message Event Duration ...........................................................42 
Table 12.  LKL–DNMS Message Event Likelihood ........................................................43 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AFWA Air Force Weather Agency 
BPSK Bi-Phase Shift Key 
CAP Common Alerting Protocol 
CDMA Code Division Multiple Access 
CMAS Commercial Mobile Alert System 
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check 
CRED Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 
DIR DNMS Message Event Shape Direction Field 
DNMS Disaster Notification Messaging Service 
DoDD Department of Defense Directive 
DSSS Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum 
DUR DNMS Message Event Duration Field 
EGNOS European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service 
ETYPE DNMS Message Event Type Field 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 
FOC Final Operations Capable 
GDACS Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System 
GEO Geosynchronous Earth Orbit 
GPD Gross Domestic Product 
GPS Global Positioning System 
GPSW Global Positioning System Wing 
HFA Hyogo Framework for Action 
 xiv
ICD Interface Control Document 
IOC Initial Operations Capable 
IPAWS Integrated Public Alert and Warning System 
JSpOC Joint Space Operations Center 
LKLI DNMS Message Event Likelihood Field  
LOC DNMS Message Event Location Field 
MCS Master Control Station 
MEO Medium Earth Orbit 
MSGID DNMS Message Event Identification Field 
NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
NSS National Security Strategy 
PDOP Position Dilution of Precision 
PNT Position Navigation and Timing 
PPS Precision Positioning Service 
PREC DNMS Message Event Precedence Field 
PRN Pseudo-Random Number 
RAT DNMS Message Event Shape Ratio Field 
SAME Specific Area Message Encoding  
SATCOM Satellite Communications 
SBAS Satellite Based Augmentation System 
SEV DNMS Message Event Severity Field 
SHP DNMS Message Event Shape Field 
SIZ DNMS Message Event Size Field 
SMC Space and Missiles Center 
 xv
SMS Short Message Service 
SoL Safety of Life 
SOPS Space Operations Squadron 
SPS Standard Positioning Service 
TIM DNMS Message Event Time Start Field 
TXT DNMS Message Event Text Field 
WAAS Wide Area Augmentation Service 
WEA Wireless Emergency Alert 
WGS84 World Geodetic System 1984 









First and foremost, I would like to thank my beautiful wife, Robyn Burwell, 
whose unyielding patience and support has allowed me to combat the tyranny of the 
urgent in this endeavor. I would also like to extend thanks and appreciation to my thesis 
advisor Daniel Bursch for his patience and optimism.   
  
 xviii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 1
I. INTRODUCTION  
Throughout recorded history, natural and man-made disasters have killed and 
continue to kill millions. While some disasters strike with little warning, oftentimes there 
exists some element of prediction or warning; many disasters can be forecast hours, days 
or more in advance, or have durations which can be forecast days or months in advance. 
Earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, floods, tsunamis, blizzards, hurricanes, tornadoes, 
droughts, extreme temperatures, wildfires, epidemic outbreaks and radiation hazards all 
have some measure of predictability or have durations that can be exploited by warning 
systems for the betterment of society. While these disasters may be arguably beyond the 
scope of society to control, it is within society’s control to alert those who would 
otherwise come to harm. With warning, individuals can act to save lives throughout all 
stages of disaster events.   
Modern disaster notification systems are inherently localized at national levels, 
disaggregated, or require subscriptions to information feeds. Within the United States and 
other high gross domestic product (GDP) nations, significant work has been done to 
integrate and ensure warning information is received by all individuals, but the United 
Nations reports that there remains much work to be done, especially in countries with 
lower GDPs, which have significantly increased disaster mortality rates (United Nations 
Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2011). By approaching the problem differently and 
inserting disaster notification information into a worldwide broadcast system that a 
significant number of individuals already access data through, such as the Global 
Positioning System (GPS) data broadcast stream, disaster alert and notification data can 
be sent as persistent and free information to the world, automatically ingested in 
electronic devices already used by consumers. This analysis will theorize a feasible, low 
cost disaster notification system which can integrate the existing GPS space based 
architecture into existing aggregated notification systems, to provide a disaster 
notification service to the world.   
 2
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. EXISTING DISASTER NOTIFICATION SYSTEMS 
There currently exists a wide variety of systems intended to aggregate disaster 
information in order to streamline notification, response and recovery efforts. 
Commercially, in recent years there has also been an effort amongst organizations to 
utilize social networking systems to transmit disaster notification information to 
individuals through phone, SMS text, email, FaceBook, MySpace, Twitter and a myriad 
of other systems. In commercial systems, active participation is required through 
subscription or opt-in services in order to receive alert information.   
Within the U.S. government under the Department of Homeland Security, the 
Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) has been developed to integrate 
into the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) framework and send 
information for imminent threats, presidential alerts, or AMBER alerts to the public 
(FEMA, 2013). Imminent threats include natural, accidental or man-made disasters. The 
IPAWS system is designed to disseminate alert and warning information through phone, 
radio, and TV, and is intended to be scalable with new and emerging technology. 
National, local or state officials can send authenticated messages tailored to specific areas 
through the IPAWS framework to reach individuals at the national, local or state levels, 
respectively.   
IPAWS is also tied to the Commercial Mobile Alert System (CMAS) which can 
provide Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) text messages through most mobile phone 
service providers (FEMA, 2013). Wireless providers representing approximately 97% of 
the U.S. population are active participants in disseminating WEAs (CTIA, 2013), though 
while the U.S. government mandated that all mobile phones will be compliant in 2012, 
“…not all phones and operating systems are capable of receiving [alerts]” (Fox 13 Staff, 2013). 
Phone software and hardware versions as well as wireless carrier systems affect the 
ability for users to receive messages. During Hurricane Sandy in October of 2012 when 
24 U.S. States had lost power, displaced persons, or destroyed homes, Verizon-serviced 
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iPhone 4S and 5 generation phones were unable to receive alerts; however, those same 
generation phones received alerts under AT&T service. Differing combinations of phone 
operating system types and versions (Android, iOS, Windows 8, Blackberry OS, et al.) 
service providers (AT&T, Alltel, Verizon, Sprint, et al.) and towers precluded some users 
from receiving alerts. FEMA reports that phone carriers and manufacturers will continue 
to voluntarily increase the number of supported devices. In cases where cell phone towers 
are overloaded with traffic, WEAs have priority and will still be delivered, though if 
power is lost at towers due to a disaster, no WEAs would be transmitted. Also, the 
CMAS system is inherently localized, as a service provided by the U.S. government for 
U.S. citizens.   
Across international borders there are few truly global alert and notification 
options available. The United Nations in collaboration with the European Commission 
maintains the Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS). The GDACS 
establishes partnerships with scientific monitoring organizations and aggregates 
worldwide disaster information during the first phase following a natural disaster. The 
primary users of GDACS, however, are governments and disaster response organizations. 
There is no direct system or process in place for individuals to receive GDACS alert 
information, though users have access to disaster information on the GDACS website. 
Several specific types of disasters have international organizations or frameworks 
established to aid in alert and notification, such as the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center 
hosted by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), but these 
systems are generally not explicitly tied into international natural disaster warning 
systems, and are localized to an event type and geographic area.   
The Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) is a 10-year United Nations plan 
intending to explain, describe and detail required work from all different sectors and 
actors to reduce disaster losses. Priority 2 of this plan is to “Identify, assess and monitor 
disaster risks and enhance early warning” (Hyogo Framework for Action, 2011). Progress 
for all nations is periodically reported on; results from this report indicate that in some 
nations early warning systems are in place for all major hazards with outreach to 
communities, but in many nations only risk information and monitoring is available.  
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Disaster Risk Mitigation systems tend to be regionally focused and skewed toward stand-
alone investments instead of integrated at the multi-national level.   
Each notification system necessitates the use of a messaging format or protocol. 
Most United States systems rely on the standardized Common Alerting Protocol (CAP). 
The CAP was built upon the Extensible Markup Language (XML) framework to be 
simple, machine and human readable, straightforwardly implemented, support a wide 
variety of applications as well as to simultaneously disseminate alert and warning 
information over disparate warning systems. Within the United States, the Department of 
Homeland Security, the National Weather Service under the NOAA, the United States 
Geological Survey, and others, as well as many state and local governments utilize the 
CAP. Within the Department of Homeland Security, the CAP is the foundational 
technology for IPAWS as well as CMAS. The International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU) adopted the CAP specification in 2007 to lay the foundation for future international 
disaster alert information sharing. Canada and Australia have both developed and utilize 
localized variants of the CAP.   
B. DISASTER STATISTICS 
The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the School 
of Public Health of the Universite catholique de Louvain maintains a database of all 
natural disaster events that have occurred worldwide from 1900–2011 compiled from a 
variety of sources to include United Nations agencies, non-governmental agencies, 
insurance companies, research institutes, etc (CRED, 2011). A natural disaster must meet 
one of the following criteria in order to be considered: 10 or more people killed, 100 or 
more people affected, declaration of a state of emergency or a call for international 
assistance.   
In general, the effects of natural disaster events change drastically with time and 
notification technology. As reporting systems evolve, the number of reported events 
worldwide continues to increase to approximately 400 annual events having occurred in 
2011. As warning and notification systems advance, the number of persons killed 
continues to decrease to approximately 20,000 individuals in 2011, while the number of 
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persons affected continues to increase to approximately 250,000,000 individuals in 2011. 
These trends can be seen in Figure 1, provided by CRED.   
 
 
Figure 1.  Natural Disaster Statistical Summary 1900–2011 (From CRED) 
The maximum number of distinct natural disasters per year peaked in 2001 with 
approximately 450 events. Within a single country, some events last for hours, while 
other simultaneous events last for months. For instance, in Afghanistan in 2012, multiple 
brief earthquakes and an 8 month drought were experienced simultaneously. Detailed 
statistical analysis refined to a high fidelity timeframe of individual days and hours could 
not be found, so a preliminary analysis was performed on CRED disaster data from 2010 
to present. The global average disaster event duration is approximately 22.2 days with a 
1σ standard deviation of 58.9 days. Accounting for 0 to +3σ potential events (99.9% of 
all events) yields a potential event duration of 198.9 days. Using the maximum annual 
number of events from 1900–2010, averaged daily, there are approximately 1.23 events 
per day. Assuming an approximately even distribution of events throughout the year, this 
assumption yields approximately 244.6 simultaneous events occurring (not starting, but 
occurring with overlapping durations) world-wide per day, on average. A notification 
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system must have capacity to account for 244.6 simultaneous natural disaster events in 
order to account for all disaster events with 99.9% certainty. The average number killed 
per natural disaster is 349 individuals, with a 1σ standard deviation of 7180 individuals. 
In calculating standard deviations in values above mean, a normal distribution is 
assumed; this assumption and the statistics involved in driving notification system 
requirements needs to be further refined.   
Figure 2 shows the relative number and type of the most common and most 
impacting natural disaster events from 1900–2011, and is used as a baseline of event 
types in designing a natural disaster notification system.   
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Figure 2.  Reported Natural Disaster Event Types 1900–2011 (From CRED) 
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Figure 3.  Technological Disaster Statistics 1900–2011 (From CRED) 
The analysis accounts for only natural disasters, not those which are man-made; 
statistics accounting for all man-made disasters are not readily available. CRED reports 
disaster data for a subset of man-made events deemed technological disasters, including 
chemical or gas leaks, explosions, transportation accidents, et al., but many significant 
events such as genocide, armed conflict, terrorist attack, or other man-made events are 
not accounted for. Figure 3 shows technological disasters from 1900–2011. This includes 
data for events such as transportation accidents or some industrial accidents that have a 
duration or event start that cannot be forecast or would not be included in a disaster 
notification system; this analysis assumes that these man-made accidents are 
inconsequential to the total disaster event numbers which ultimately drive notification 
system requirements. Similar to natural disasters, technological and man-made disasters 
change significantly with advances in technology. The number of worldwide reported 
events, number of individuals killed and number of individuals affected increased 
significantly from 1970–2002, then dropped sharply to 2011 levels. The average disaster 
event duration is approximately 1.37 days with a 1σ standard deviation of 8.76 days. 
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Accounting for 0 to +3σ potential events (99.9% of all events) yields an event duration of 
27.7 days. Using the 2011 annual number of events, averaged daily, there are 
approximately .55 events per day. Assuming an approximately even distribution of events 
throughout the year, this assumption yields approximately 15.1 simultaneous events 
occurring (not starting, but occurring with overlapping durations) per day, on average. A 
notification system must have capacity to account for 15.1 simultaneous technological 
disaster events. For the purposes of this analysis, it will be assumed that the number of 
man-made disaster events not included in the CRED technological disaster statistical 
analysis are inconsequential to the design of a disaster notification system. The average 
number killed per technological disaster is 30.8 individuals, with a 1σ of 53 individuals. 
The stated assumptions on standard deviation and statistics also apply.   
 
 
Figure 4.  Natural Disaster Geographic Distribution 2011 
(From Guha-Sapir et. al.) 
Geographic distribution of natural disasters plays a critical role in understanding 
disaster event statistics and in ultimately deriving notification system requirements. 
Figure 4 shows the continental distribution of natural disasters by disaster type grouping 
in 2011, and it can be seen that events are approximately distributed East-West, 
interpreted to assume a relative global distribution. This figure does not provide detailed 
information on the relative sizes of events or their geographic distribution by size, and 
statistics are not readily available. It will be assumed that disaster events are 
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approximately evenly distributed globally with a size up to global, but this assumption 
needs to be further refined.   
In total, to capture 99.9% of natural and technological disasters, a disaster 
notification system would need to be capable of simultaneously processing 261 (244.8 
natural and 15.1 technological) daily disasters.  Two hundred sixty one events assumes 
that a notification system trigger and report on events using the same criteria as used in 
the CRED data, whereas realistically different criteria would be used such that the 
capacity of a notification system matches the real-world disaster events reportable by 
system’s trigger criteria. The average number of individuals killed per event, for all event 
types reported by CRED is 251. Throughout this analysis of disaster events however, 
numerous assumptions were made regarding the numbers and distributions of time, 
duration, geographic location, size, type, etc. These assumptions and the statistical 
analysis should be further refined to develop requirements before implementing a world-
wide disaster notification system.   
C. GPS-ENABLED SMARTPHONE USE 
In 2011, approximately 87% of the worldwide population owned or operated a 
mobile phone subscriber service. That same year, of the approximately 6 billion mobile 
phone users, 700 million used ‘smart phones’ with advanced computational capability. It 
is estimated that by 2017, of the forecast 9 billion mobile phone users, over 3 billion will 
use ‘smart phones’ (Mobithinking, 2013). Smart phone technology is continuing to grow 
at exponential rates and is becoming ubiquitous in all modern societies, offering 
unprecedented communication opportunities. In 2011, approximately 80% of smart 
phones were GPS enabled, with this percentage also continuing to trend upward 
exponentially (Rebello, 2010). In 2011, more than 560 million people can be reached 
near-instantly through the GPS signal via cell phones alone, and that number will 
continue to rise. 
In addition to smart-phones, other electronic devices can utilize the GPS data 
stream. Laptops, tablets, hand-held video game devices and a variety of stand-alone 
navigation and other systems are increasingly GPS enabled. In many modern 
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automobiles, GPS navigation is offered standard. Similar to cell phones, other electronic 
devices will increasingly continue to incorporate the GPS signal. It is assumed that those 
individuals with access to GPS data approximately represent the relative cross section of 
individuals affected by natural or technological disasters.   
D. AN IDEAL WARNING SYSTEM 
An ideal disaster notification system is generally considered to be a collection of 
systems both to aggregate source reportable events as well as transmit notification data 
through a variety of mediums in order to reach the maximum number of individuals in 
the shortest time period possible. These systems must utilize technology and information 
systems that are ubiquitous in the largest number of international societies reaching as 
many individuals as possible, potentially through a wide variety of information systems. 
The ideal information receiver would be integrated in some capacity with a device or 
information stream that individuals already voluntarily use as an information hub which 
has standalone power/battery capabilities. The system would need to be standardized in a 
way that allows competing manufacturers to create a variety of devices compatible with 
the system to drive materiel and manufacturing costs down. The system would also need 
to be responsive to multiple simultaneous disaster events with sufficient data throughput 
capacity to provide simultaneous notifications world-wide in near real-time, tailored to 
the location affected by the disaster. Additionally, the system needs to be feasibly and 
inexpensively implementable. Figure 5 depicts a generalized national level notification 
system in which local and regional event information filters up to higher level reporting 
and aggregation, as well as is transmitted using available means at each level, ultimately 
reaching the end user through a variety of means and mediums.   
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Figure 5.  Generalized National Level Notification System 
This generalized ideal system is functionally similar to the FEMA’s IPAWS 
system in the United States, but can be applied more broadly to support international 
events and additional transmission means, as depicted in Figure 6. This modified 
generalized system would be comprised of reporting nodes at local, regional and national 
levels, aggregating nodes, international command and control, and a variety of 
transmission mediums. The reporting nodes require trusted communication to 
aggregating nodes which represent major worldwide geographical or functional areas. 
Aggregating nodes would send disaster information to a central command and control 
location which would utilize a variety of transmission mediums, potentially including 




Figure 6.  Generalized Expanded Notification System 
This communication scheme would allow event reporting from local to 
international levels to be centrally transmitted through all available communication 
means for the affected local area(s). One component of this idealized system is the ability 
to transmit notification data to local, regional, national or arbitrarily defined geographic 
areas irrespective of national boundaries. Additionally, many of the terrestrial and 
consumer links in transmission mediums such as cell phone towers, data processing 
facilities, etc can be bypassed and information more directly transmitted to end users. 
There exists a unique and unprecedented opportunity to use the existing GPS architecture 
to transmit data to GPS-enabled smart phones and other GPS enabled devices and 
provide this transmission medium in order to reach a significant number of users world-
wide. This system would trigger human and automated machine responses to save lives, 
and would permeate the earth to reach individuals potentially unreachable through other 
means. The approach to utilize the GPS architecture for disaster notification services 
analyzed here will henceforth be referred to as the GPS Disaster Notification Messaging 
Service (DNMS, pronounced ‘din mis’), and the factors to consider in implementing said 
system will be the focus of this analysis.   
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E. GPS BACKGROUND 
1. System Overview 
The GPS is a day or night, all weather radio broadcast based global navigation 
satellite system (GNSS), functionally broken into three disparate segments: the space 
segment consists of a constellation of medium earth orbit satellites and the transmitted 
GPS signals; the control segment consists of ground antennas, monitor stations and 
command and control nodes; the user segment consists of all users and systems in receipt 
of GPS signals.   
The space segment by original design required a constellation size of 24 broadcast 
spacecraft split amongst 6 orbital planes, each at 55 degree inclination, separated by 60 
degrees in geometric location of the ascending node. A medium earth semi-synchronous 
orbit was chosen such that the period exactly matches half of one sidereal day. As of 
November 2012, 30–31 healthy satellites simultaneously broadcast usable GPS data, 
exceeding the standard baseline. Due to a coding limitation with signal structure, on older 
legacy signals no more than 32 usable ‘healthy’ satellites can simultaneously exist. Each 
satellite continuously broadcasts a combination of its own clock and ephemeris data as 
well as orbit information for other satellites in the constellation; it is through this data that 
GPS position, navigation and timing (PNT) solutions can be acquired. With 32 healthy 
satellites, on average, 8–11 satellites are in view of any location on earth at any given 
time. Due to the constellation design utilizing trilateration to mitigate position dilution of 
precision (PDOP) uncertainty, terrestrial observers see the satellites always moving and 
generally dispersed throughout the sky. The combination of the number of spacecraft and 
their orbital geometry ultimately allow the constellation to be a reliable source of 
information at any time, for world-wide users. 
The control segment is responsible for maintaining the health of the entire GPS. 
As of November 2012, the control segment had access to 4 indigenous ground antennas 
as well as 8 additional Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN) antennas, all 
geographically separated. Ground antennas are responsible for 2 way C-Band command 
and control of GPS satellites, to include verification of telemetry, data uploads, as well as 
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downloads of additional payload information (i.e., Nuclear Detonation Subsystem). In 
November 2012, the control segment had access to 6 indigenous monitor stations as well 
as 11 additional National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) monitor stations, all 
geographically separated. Monitor stations are responsible for continuously receiving L-
Band payload information and relaying data to the command and control nodes. The 
primary command and control node and 24/7 operations center, dubbed the Master 
Control Station (MCS), is located at Schriever AFB, CO. The alternate MCS is located at 
Vandenberg AFB, CA. The net effect of the control segment is that at any moment, every 
satellite’s payload broadcast data is being monitored and any satellite can be contacted to 
be corrected or updated.   
 
Figure 7.  Control Segment Infrastructure 
The user segment consists of all users, automated equipment and systems in 
receipt of any GPS signal. This includes military users as well as civilian users with 
diverse systems to include: military personnel and aircraft tracking and navigation, car 
navigation, banking financial transaction timing, farm equipment mapping and 
navigation, et al.   
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2. Signals and Modernization 
The GPS was designed for the payload to operate in the L-band as a balance 
between atmospheric attenuation of higher frequencies and lower data-rate of lower 
frequencies. A circular polarization was chosen to mitigate the effects of Faraday rotation 
on polarity as the signals pass through the ionosphere. A Bi-Phase Shift Key (BPSK) 
direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) modulation scheme was chosen to allow 
significant processor integration gain in noisy signal environments without interfering 
with other systems and ultimately make the system robust against inadvertent 
interference. Each satellite transmits on the same base frequencies, but code division 
multiple access (CDMA) is used to differentiate and uniquely identify each satellite and 
individually process each satellite’s data. Each vehicle broadcasts data modulated on a 
separate pseudo-random number (PRN) code, and by publicly publishing the PRN codes 
in a GPS interface control document (ICD), receiver equipment can be manufactured 
with PRN codes pre-defined in software and hardware in order to track each GPS 
satellite.   
 Launch L1 L2 L5 
IIA 1990–1997 C/A P(Y)   P(Y)    
IIR 1997–2004 C/A P(Y)   P(Y)    
IIR-M 2005–2009 C/A P(Y)   P(Y) L2C*   
IIF 2010-Future C/A P(Y)  M* P(Y) L2C* M* SoL* 
IIIA+* Future C/A* P(Y)* L1C* M* P(Y)* L2C* M* SoL* 
*Not broadcasting healthy PNT data or not yet launched 
Table 1.   Current and Future GPS Broadcast Types 
On the Block I, II, IIA and IIR GPS satellites launched through 2004, a legacy 
unencrypted standard positioning service (SPS) civilian course acquisition (C/A) code 
and a precision positioning service (PPS) encrypted military (P(Y)) code has been 
broadcast. The military P(Y) signal has lower peak power at the center frequency, but has 
10 times the bandwidth increasing overall received energy, substantially increasing 
resistance to purposeful or inadvertent interference radiation.  
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Figure 8.  GPS Frequency and Broadcast Signals 
Beginning in 2005 with the Block IIR-M satellites, each successive generation 
adds additional modernized signals, including L2C, M, and ‘safety of life’ (SoL) signals. 
The modernized signals allow the use of more than 32 healthy PRN codes, alleviating a 
layer of specificity in the legacy design, and also changed the data structure from strict 
bitwise definitions to a more flexible messaging structure. Though the modernized 
signals have existed on satellite vehicles, no healthy usable data is transmitted due to 
limitations in development of the control and user GPS segments.   
 
 Healthy 2013 2015 Projection* Total 
IIA 9 5 28 
IIR 12 11 12 
IIR-M 7 7 8 
IIF 3 6 12 
III 0 2 32 
*2015 assumes base-lined attrition of older vehicles 
Table 2.   GPS Block Constellation Size (From Shaw) 
The Block IIF first launched in 2010 and the future Block III satellites add a 
distinct new civilian SoL broadcast on an L5 signal. The L5 signal is located in an 
aeronautical navigation band with more protected frequency space than the L1 or L2 
signals in order to mitigate interference. This new signal is also of a modernized flexible 
messaging structure, but similar to other modernized signals, no healthy usable data is 
currently available. Similar to the P(Y) broadcast, the L5 broadcast will have a 
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significantly larger bandwidth (~10 times) that of the main lobe of C/A, L1C or L2C, but 
with identical data rate will therefore have higher processing gain and be less susceptible 
to inadvertent or intentional interference.   
Any modernized civilian broadcasts can be considered for the DNMS, but given 
the protected nature of the frequency range in which the L5 SoL signal resides and the 
significant protection from interference through an increase in L5 bandwidth and 
processing gain, the L5 signal was chosen as the focus of the DNMS system. 
Within a legacy or modernized, military or civilian signal, of 300 primary 
message bits, 24 are dedicated as cyclic redundancy check (CRC) bits acting as parity to 
ensure that the message is received as intended from the satellite. The probability that a 
received sub-frame or message contains a single bit error is approximately 1e-18, based 
on ICD-GPS-200E, and is assumed to be statistically irrelevant for the purposes of this 
analysis.  
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III. GPS DNMS 
The GPS DNMS is the theorized system in which disaster alert and notification 
information is embedded into existing available bandwidth of the L5 SoL GPS signal. As 
a system, DNMS includes the control segments and information links necessary for 
command and control of the system, the space system including both satellite vehicles 
capable of broadcasting the L5 signal as well as the structure of the DNMS message 
embedded in the L5 signal, and the user segment in receipt of the DNMS messages. Each 
segment of DNMS will be discussed.   
A. DNMS REQUIREMENTS 
The summary of threshold and objective requirements of the DNMS are 
highlighted in Table 3; explanations of requirements follow. It is expected that - due to a 
significant period of time before a fully operationally capable constellation is in place - 
initial operations capable (IOC) requirements will be established for the system that are 
less stringent in execution than the final operations capable (FOC) requirements. While 
the FOC requirements represent significant capability, IOC requirements will likely 
consist of a control segment capable of transmitting a DNMS message and at least 1 
satellite vehicle transmitting a DNMS message. Many requirements are designed around 
both the theorized system capacity discussed later, as well as disaster statistics.   
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FOC Requirements Threshold Requirement Objective Requirement 
Trigger Criteria 200 killed - or -  
National disaster declaration
100 killed - or -  
National disaster declaration
Simultaneous support to 
events globally with 
99.9% certainty 
Up to 101 events Up to 103 events 
Simultaneous support to 
events globally with 
simultaneous DNMS 
messages and 99.9% 
certainty 
Up to 126 messages Up to 129 messages 
Timeliness from 
notification of event start 
to broadcast on first 
supporting satellite over 
area 
1 hr 25 min 
Maximum event size Global Global 
Minimum event size 50 km 10 km 
Identify event location to 
within 
16.66 km 3.33 km 
Simultaneous satellite 
vehicles supporting a 
single event 
1 satellite 3 satellites 
Maximum message 
interval for single event 
support 
1200 sec 600 sec 
Table 3.   DNMS Requirements 
1. Trigger Criteria and Global Event Support 
In order for an event to be considered sufficiently disastrous to be triggered and 
included within the DNMS, a minimum baseline of event requirements is established. 
The trigger criteria and thresholds of DNMS are different than the CRED disaster 
statistical analysis criteria. The trigger criteria has been approximately modified to match 
the potential bandwidth of the DNMS system. As new or additional bandwidth, signals or 
other technologies emerge, the trigger criteria can be modified to include more events and 
maintain 99.9% event and message coverage. Additionally, as higher fidelity statistics - 
including data on geographic size and distribution - are found, the trigger criteria again 
can be modified. Of note, DNMS is designed primarily around the predicted number of 
individuals to be killed, not affected by a disaster; in 2010, natural disasters killed 
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approximately 450,000 individuals but affected approximately 200,000,000. Two 
assumptions are made regarding this design decision: other alert and warning systems are 
integrated with DNMS such that the vast majority of individuals affected are also notified 
through other means, and that based on more frequent triggers, the bandwidth of DNMS 
has insufficient capacity to report based on individuals affected.   
In order for the DNMS to trigger, an event must be sufficiently severe that death 
is a probable outcome and be sufficiently significant that at least 100 individuals are 
predicted to be killed (vice 10 killed or 100 affected to be reportable in the CRED 
analysis). The objective requirement for simultaneous disaster events is matched to the 
adjusted expected number of total simultaneous events based on the predicted killed 
trigger threshold. Based on an average number killed for natural disasters of 349 
individuals and a standard deviation of 7180, if a trigger event requires 100 individuals 
killed, 48.6% of events reported in CRED analysis exist below this threshold. This 
implies that of the 198.9 simultaneous events per day (0 to +3σ value), only 102 would be 
reportable. Using similar math for technological disasters with an average of 30.8 killed 
and a standard deviation of 53.1, a 100 individual trigger yields 90.4% below. This 
implies that of the 15.1 events (0 to +3σ value), only 1 would be reportable. Using 100 
predicted deaths during an event as a DNMS event trigger yields 103 reportable 
worldwide daily separate disaster events. The numbers here assume normal Gaussian 
distribution which is untrue and requires further refinement, but can be used as a 
preliminary baseline approximation. The objective system trigger requirement is matched 
to this 99.9% accountable value of 103. The threshold objectives were calculated using 
similar analysis for 200 individuals killed as a system trigger, to ultimately yield 101 
natural disaster and 0 technological disasters, or 101 total reportable daily separate 
disaster events worldwide accounting for 99.9% of events. Under the assumption that for 
many disaster events, it is possible to require multiple different DNMS messages be 
transmitted, this total reportable event number is multiplied by a 1.25 factor of safety to 
approximately ensure adequate bandwidth, raising the objective requirement daily total to 
129 DNMS messages and threshold requirement to 126 DNMS messages.   
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2. Timeliness 
The timeliness of the DNMS plays a significant role in establishing its overall 
effectiveness. Some disaster events, such as drought or hurricanes, can be forecast weeks 
in advance whereas other events, such as tsunamis, are much more limited; for instance, 
tsunamis can only be forecast after the mega-thrust earthquake has occurred but prior to 
waves reaching shore. Tsunamis represent one of the most impacting natural disaster 
events with one of the shortest forecast timelines, and will therefore be used to gauge 
timeliness requirements.   
Along the seabed east of Japan, many seismometers are linked to transmitters on 
the ocean surface which automatically transmit potential tsunami events to satellites and 
downlink over the Japanese mainland. The process from detection to transmission to 
users can occur on the scale of seconds to minutes and is one of the timeliest in the world, 
but the system requires significant infrastructure and exists only in Japan. No global 
system - without similar local infrastructure - can match the speed of the Japanese system 
in reporting tsunamis when there may be only minutes from the occurrence of an event 
and the impact on individuals.   
In December 2004 the longest recorded mega-thrust earthquake was observed off 
the coast of Sumatra, Indonesia creating a tsunami that killed over 230,000 individuals in 
14 countries. The earthquake occurred at 00:58 UTC. By 01:23 UTC, the tsunami 
reached Sumatra and by 02:23, the tsunami reached Sri Lanka. The characteristics of 
tsunami waves change significantly from deep to shallow waters, and vary in speed from 
approximately 750 km/h to 20 km/h, respectively. South Africa experienced only 2 
deaths from this tsunami, but at 8500 km from the epicenter, could have been affected as 
early as 11 hours after the earthquake. Generally, the range in time from earthquake to 
tsunami striking a coast is 25 minutes to 11 hours.   
All communication links from detection, processing, intermediate transmissions 
and final transmission to users as well as adequate time for a user to act must be 
accomplished prior to 25 minutes elapsed in order to have a truly effective system. 
DNMS represents only one intermediate link and a final transmission path as components 
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of a greater overarching warning system. The timeliness of DNMS is measured from the 
notification of a forecast or occurring event at the DNMS control segment to the 
transmission of a DNMS message in the space segment under the assumption that the 
detection, processing and transmission to the DNMS control segment is largely 
automated and nearly instantaneous. The timeliness objective requirement therefore is 
approximated at 25 minutes. The DNMS will rely on the GPS control segment, where a 
modernized satellite contact (without NDS operations) takes approximately 25 minutes. 
The control segment supports a substantial number of satellites through limited ground 
antennas. Resource conflicts occasionally occur, and it is possible - through routine 
maintenance, anomalies or other higher priority operations—that simultaneous DNMS 
message requirements must be broadcast to different satellites from the same ground 
antenna. In this case, one satellite support must be completed, resources shifted, and a 
second satellite contact performed. The threshold requirement therefore is 1 hour, under 
the assumption that completing a satellite contact, shifting resources and beginning a 
second contact will add approximately 10 minutes.   
The DNMS is one component of an ideal warning system which can only ever be 
as responsive as the sum of its components. The DNMS offers many significant 
advantages through integration with other disaster notification systems, but the timelines 
or forecast required for some events such as earthquakes or tsunamis may be faster than 
DNMS can support. DNMS messages for related sub-disaster components of those events 
would be transmitted; for instance, forecast earthquake aftershocks or forecast sustained 
flooding following tsunamis.   
3. Event Location and Size 
Disaster events with the potential to kill vary significantly in size. Statistical 
information regarding size distribution is unavailable, therefore assumptions will be 
made. Tropical cyclones represent one of the geographically largest possible disaster 
events; typhoon tip in 1979 represents the largest tropical cyclone in recorded history 
with a diameter of 2,220 km. While this unique event could have covered half of the 
United States, it is possible other events such as drought or an epidemic outbreak could 
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have global reaches. The maximum reportable event size threshold and objective 
requirements therefore are global. The geographically smallest possible disaster with 200 
or more predicted deaths is likely a man-made event with significant potency. In such 
cases, it is hypothesized that reporting an event for a small town is realistically the 
smallest area requiring notification. The minimum event size objective requirement 
therefore represents a small town at 10 km; the minimum reportable event size threshold 
requirement represents a large town at 50 km.   
Locating a disaster event of the minimum event size is dependent upon the 
resolution at which the system is able to identify the event center. It is assumed that the 
size of the reported event will be increased beyond the actual event in order to ensure the 
entire area is reported. With a resolution one third the size of the geographically smallest 
reportable event and a small increase in size, the majority of a reported event matches its 
actual event. The size resolution is therefore one third the minimum event size, or a 
resolution threshold requirement of 16.66 km, and objective requirement of 3.33 km.   
4. Simultaneous Satellite Overlap 
In order to ensure a receiver has the potential to receive a DNMS message, it must 
be within the footprint of a satellite broadcasting a DNMS message. Obscura or low 
elevation can prevent a handset from receiving and processing the signal, therefore, it 
will be assumed that satellites must be above 10 degrees elevation in order to be 
considered visible, even though many handsets can track satellites below this threshold if 
clear line of sight is available. If the space segment is transmitting a DNMS message to a 
user, the system is considered functional; therefore the threshold requirement is 
established such that at least 1 satellite in view is transmitting the DNMS message. The 
GPS is designed to minimize PDOP, therefore satellites have a high probability of being 
distributed throughout the sky, varying significantly in azimuth and elevation. In order to 
ensure message receipt in an environment with potential obscura such as buildings in an 
urban environment, the objective requirement is established such that at least 3 satellites 
in view are transmitting the DNMS message.   
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5. Message Reporting Interval 
It is assumed that upon notification, the DNMS will react as quickly as is feasible 
to broadcast notification information over an event. Once the initial broadcast has 
occurred, the system duty cycle, or interval requirement, will determine the frequency at 
which the message is repeated. A high duty cycle will ensure that users receives the 
message as quickly as possible, but once the message is received, the additional 
transmissions of repeated messages are essentially wasted bandwidth that could have 
otherwise been used to transmit other DNMS messages. Under the assumption that the 
initial message and notification is transmitted as soon as feasible, a slower duty cycle can 
be chosen to balance bandwidth for longer disaster events.  Six hundred second and 1200 
second timing intervals were chosen for the objective and threshold requirements 
respectively; the system may transmit much more frequently than the 600 and 1200 
second requirements based on available bandwidth and other simultaneously occurring 
events.   
B. DNMS ASSUMPTIONS 
Many specific details on the future operational implementation of the GPS L5 
signal on block IIF, III and future GPS satellite vehicles are as of yet undecided. Details 
from operators and engineers at 2SOPS, mission planners at the Joint Space Operations 
Center (JSpOC), engineers and acquisition Officers at the Space and Missiles Center 
(SMC) GPS Wing have been aggregated throughout this document, but many 
assumptions must still be made on how DNMS messages would or could be handled, 
partly using message type 15 text messages as a corollary. In lieu of specific executable 
details, some realistic and extremely conservative assumptions about message capability, 
handling concept of operations, etc are made here and are assumed to be true throughout 
the remainder of this analysis.   
Block IIF, III and future L5 capable satellite vehicles will, at a minimum: 
 have adequate memory and buffer storage to hold and have access to 
broadcast a minimum of 32 L5 broadcast text or DNMS messages per 
navigation upload from the control segment. 
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 appropriately control the transmission timing of a text or DNMS messages 
in the L5 broadcast based upon compliance with other mandatory message 
timing requirements as defined in ICD-GPS-705C.   
 have no restrictions on the frequency at which text or DNMS messages 
can transition between different messages, so long as the messages comply 
with the timing requirements as defined in ICD-GPS-705C in the L5 
broadcast.   
 have the ability to forecast the transmission windows for text or DNMS 
messages up to 1 week in the L5 broadcast based upon visibility forecasts.   
 have adequate message slot availability to broadcast each text or DNMS 
message at least once in each 144 second super-frame period of time in the 
L5 broadcast. 
Another significant assumption is that this system would potentially take years to 
reach FOC, and likely decades for a constellation of all L5 capable vehicles to be 
realized. The DNMS IOC would occur in the near term providing limited DNMS 
messaging capability with a small subset of healthy L5 capable GPS satellites. 
The final and most significant assumption required for this system to be realized 
is that manufacturers will incorporate the processing of this additional data in their 
devices. Throughout the early 2000’s, once manufacturers understood the advantages and 
potential profits from incorporating the GPS SPS C/A broadcast on the L1 frequency data 
stream into devices such as cell phones, GPS features were incorporated by default and 
have become ubiquitous. Similarly, by making this type of information available and 
known to consumers, manufacturers will be driven to incorporate into the operating 
systems of virtually all devices capable of receiving it. This demand can be described as a 
capitalistic imperative, as the required effort to utilize DNMS messages on a device 
already capable of receiving the L5 signal is largely insubstantial.   
C. DNMS SPACE SEGMENT 
1. L5 Bandwidth Analysis 
Since the inception of GPS, the traditional legacy civil (C/A) SPS and encrypted 
military (P(Y)) PPS signals on the L1 and L2 frequencies have a fixed repeating 1500-bit 
frame, with 300-bit sub-frames, as currently defined in IS-GPS-200F. By defining each 
bit of the message, there is little flexibility in adding new data or changing data types that 
 29
are broadcast for highly dynamic environments or changing system requirements without 
adversely impacting the space, control and user segment in catastrophic ways. There are 
several seemingly random unused bits reserved for future use, but they do not offer 
substantial flexibility or bandwidth that would be necessary to implement a disaster 
notification system. The GPS L5 SoL signal utilizes a modernized broadcast format in 
which various different 300-bit pre-defined message types are broadcast with specific 
timing interval requirements, as defined in IS-GPS-705C. Each message type being 300 
bits long and transmitted at 50 bps means that each message type requires 6 seconds to 
fully transmit, to include message type identifier information, parity, error correction, etc.  
Table 4 adapted from IS-GPS-705C shows the required data and minimum interval 
requirements for the L5 signal messages, which is ultimately used to determine available 
bandwidth.   
Message Data Message Type Number Maximum Broadcast Interval** 
Ephemeris 10 & 11 24 sec 
Clock Type 30 - 37 24 sec 
ISC, IONO 30 144 sec 
Reduced Almanac 31 or 12 10 min 
Midi Almanac 37 60 min 
EOP 32 15 min 
UTC 33 144 sec 
Diff Correction 34 or (13 & 14) 15 min* 
GGTO 35 144 sec 
Text 36 or 15 As needed 
*When differential corrections are available. 
**Intervals specified are maximum; as such, the broadcast intervals may be shorter. 
Table 4.   L5 Message Broadcast Intervals 
Because the modernized L5 signal is not yet implemented, the concept of 
operations is not yet defined, and some vehicle capabilities not yet defined or 
constructed, there were several assumptions made in performing an analysis of available 
bandwidth; efforts have been made for assumptions to be conservative in terms of finding 
available bandwidth. Firstly, it was assumed that the 24 second interval requirement for 
message type 30–37 containing clock information will be met when any message of type 
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30 through 37 which contains clock information is broadcast, even if that broadcast meets 
a different timing requirement (i.e., Midi Almanac every 60 minutes). It was 
conservatively assumed that the reduced almanac data will be broadcast as message type 
12, so as to not meet the clock information requirement. Also, the differential correction 
data is assumed to be available and will be broadcast as message types 13 and 14 instead 
of 34, again so as to not meet the clock information requirement. There were two types of 
analysis done: mathematical and simulation.   
The mathematical analysis was performed by calculating the percentage of time 
that each message type requirement will be broadcast and subtracting those broadcast 
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any element of the set of message types {30–37} or {12,31}, respectively. The 


































































From an idealized mathematical analysis, 22.66 percent of the time, there is 
available bandwidth in the 50 bps stream of data for additional data types and 
information. In any given hour of 3600 seconds, broadcasting data at 50 bps, with each 
message lasting 300 bits, there are 600 messages transmitted. This means that, rounding 
conservatively, there are 135 available messages slots for text, DNMS or other messages. 
This mathematical analysis has an inherently flawed assumption in averaging for an 
indeterminate period of time that simultaneous message requirements will never occur to 
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force earlier message transmission or arrivals. Because of this assumption, a more 
rigorous simulated analysis was performed.   
The intent of the simulation was to determine a realistic and actionable method of 
maximum interval requirement implementation in order to find bandwidth availability. In 
this simulation, each 6 second block of time is referred to as a sub-frame, each 24 second 
block of time as a frame, and each 144 second block of time as a super-frame.   
Figure 9 shows a graphical representation of message timing for the first 8 super-
frames representing 1152 seconds of broadcast, though the analysis was performed for 
3600 seconds to include at a minimum the longest time interval requirement of 60 
minutes for message type 37 Midi Almanac.   
 
Figure 9.  L5 Bandwidth Simulation 
This analysis was performed by repeating message types 10 and 11 every frame in 
the first 2 sub-frame slots, as they represent the most constraining timing requirement. 
The 3rd sub-frame slot was used to meet the {30–37} requirement, either through 
separate timing requirements or by selecting any generic element of the set. The 4th sub-
frame slot was used for the remaining timing requirements. Several times in a one hour 
period, the requirements overlapped by sub-frame message slot and forced a message 
type to occur 1 frame earlier. This is a realistic occurrence that was not adequately 
captured using the mathematical percentage of time analysis. With these occasional 
overlaps, there were 133 of 600 total messages available for new data types. Extrapolated 
further beyond 3600 seconds, overlaps continue to occur, but do not drop hourly message 
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averages to below 133. While mathematically there could be up to 22.66% of available 
bandwidth, a simple, realistic and implementable approach yields 22.17% of available 
bandwidth, which for the purposes of this analysis is sufficient.   
A final assumption not yet mentioned is that no text messages of type 36 or 15, no 
new message type requirements, and no system or event driven message requirements 
were levied in addition to the interval requirements which would cause a message type to 
occur earlier than the maximum time interval. To compensate for these unknowns, it is 
assumed that an extremely conservative third of this available bandwidth could be 
otherwise occupied; therefore, a reasonable approximation and estimate is that 89 
different DNMS messages per hour, per satellite vehicle are available to support disaster 
notification, while simultaneously not affecting the transmission of PNT GPS data.   
2. Transmission Scheme 
There are primarily two different transmission architectures to be considered in 
designing DNMS transmissions: rigid or dynamically allocated. This analysis assumes all 
block IIF and block III satellites are operational with FOC declaration and standard 
satellite vehicle attrition; therefore this analysis will assume 40 of the potential total 44 
satellite vehicles are broadcasting healthy data.   
A rigid system will use ‘DNMS constellations’. A DNMS constellation is a 
relatively static and pre-defined subset of GPS vehicles required to transmit a DNMS 
message in order to ensure that a message is being transmitted to and received at a given 
disaster location for the entire duration of a disaster event. Individual satellite vehicles 
can exist within different DNMS constellations based on the configuration and 
transmitted data. Using rigid, fixed DNMS constellations, approximately 7 optimally 
chosen satellites vehicles are required in order to ensure worldwide coverage 99.99% of 
the time, with approximately 2–4 satellites in view of any location on earth at any given 
time. This assumes that all disaster events may be any size up to global with global 
DNMS transmission. In a healthy GPS constellation of 40 L5 capable vehicles, 5 unique  
DNMS constellations consisting of 7 vehicles each can be defined with 5 vehicles in 
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reserve. Optimally choosing the 7 vehicles is a computationally difficult task. Using N 
choose R (nCr) combinatorial mathematics: 
݊ܥݎ ൌ 	 ݊!ݎ! ሺ݊ െ ݎሻ! 
40!
7! ሺ40 െ 7ሻ! ∗
33!
7! ሺ33 െ 7ሻ! ∗
26!
7! ሺ26 െ 7ሻ! ∗
19!
7! ሺ19 െ 7ሻ! ∗
12!
7! ሺ12 െ 7ሻ! ൌ
40!
5 ∗ 7! ∗ 5! ൌ 2.70
ସଵ 
There exist 2.7e41 possible vehicle combinations when choosing 5 structured 7 
satellite vehicle DNMS constellations. Simplifying assumptions can be made in the 
control segment software that defines DNMS constellations such as ensuring no more 
than 3 vehicles from any given orbital plane are selected, ensuring that vehicles within an 
orbital plane are separated by more than 60 degrees true anomaly, etc. The modernized 
L5 signal is not limited to 32 PRNs in the way legacy signals are, so the number of 
possible combinations to be optimized will increase exponentially as healthy L5 capable 
vehicles increase beyond 40, though a number of additional simplifying assumptions to 
computational complexities can be added. It is assumed that the control segment will 
have sufficient computational capacity and simplifying assumptions to forecast and select 
satellites for each of the 5 DNMS constellations. Once defined, the constellations need 
not change unless a new satellite launches, a vehicle health changes, significant phasing 
maneuvers or station-keeping maneuvers are performed, etc.   
Based on an objective requirement for retransmission time of 600 seconds, each 
message must be transmitted once every 10 minutes, or each message must be transmitted 
6 times in each hour. In that same time period, each vehicle, and therefore, each DNMS 
constellation is capable of transmitting 89 unique L5 messages. Based on the ability to 
insert 2 separate DNMS messages in each L5 message, each vehicle is capable of 
supporting disaster events with 30 separate and unique disaster messages within the 
DNMS stream. Using this rigid broadcast scheme of 5 defined 7 satellite vehicle DNMS 
constellations with 5 additional vehicles available as a reserve for additional tasking 
ultimately yields 150 simultaneous disaster messages, meeting the objective requirement 
of 103 simultaneous events and 129 simultaneous DNMS messages. With this scheme, 
there is potential bandwidth not utilized based upon satellite footprint overlap, but 
otherwise is an efficient system.   
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The second option is to use a dynamically allocated transmission scheme instead 
of rigid and fixed DNMS constellations. In this scheme, as an event is reported to the 
control segment for inclusion as a disaster event, satellite vehicles are automatically 
selected from the available pool of vehicles such that visibility to the geographic region is 
tailored and specific. During visibility to the disaster event each orbital pass, the message 
is re-inserted into the data transmission, and upon leaving visibility that bandwidth is 
freed. Instead of all DNMS constellation vehicles transmitting the message continuously 
worldwide as is true in the rigid scheme, sets of vehicles and times for vehicles are 
chosen for each event, significantly increasing the available bandwidth of the system. 
This system reduces the initial computational complexity of defining mission 
constellations as well, but performing a bandwidth throughput analysis is difficult 
without higher fidelity statistics on disaster event size and distribution.   
The fixed DNMS constellation option is chosen based on its predictability and 
sustained global coverage within DNMS constellations. In either scheme, a forecast 
message will not be incorporated into a DNMS message until the message event start 
time (i.e., message start time, not actual event time) is less than 1 week in advance. This 
ensures that only current and valid data is broadcast, reduces the effects of data aging 
prior to broadcast, and reduces the possibility of annual ambiguities in date systems. 
Additionally, in either transmission scheme an identical message will occasionally be 
broadcast over a specific area from multiple satellites in view; because the messages are 
identical in content and neither message has higher or differing precedence, no conflict 
exists in the handset software in characterizing the disaster event. In cases where 
messages differ, a precedence scheme will be developed to allow receivers the ability to 
interpret differences in message content.   
3. DNMS Message Data Structure 
ICD-GPS-705C defines the text message type 15 data structure as shown in 
Figure 10. A standard text message has 232 information bits available for text, after 68 
bits are utilized in defining message type, PRN, CRC, etc. Of note is that 4 bits are 
specific to a message page number in the case where a single text message string spans 




Figure 10.  L5 Message Type 15 - Text Message (From ICD-GPS-705C) 
 
For DNMS to broadcast disaster specific information within L5 data, there are 
two possible methods. The first option is to use a pre-defined type 15 text message and 
add an overhead to the 232 data bits to allow receivers to interpret the text message as a 
DNMS message. The second and preferred option is to create a DNMS message type in 
the ICD-GPS-705C. The latter option would need to be incorporated into the control, 
space and user segments in order to ensure proper generation and receipt of a new 
message type. In the current revision of ICD-GPS-705C, 6 bits are used to identify the 
message type number, allowing 64 unique messages. Currently only 14 of the 64 message 
types are defined, so that there is adequate availability in the existing message structure 
for a new message type. A hypothesized message type 44, DNMS Message, is shown in 
Figure 11.   
 
Figure 11.  Proposed L5 Message Type 44 - DNMS Message 
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The DNMS message structure does not require uniquely identified pages, which 
adds 4 data bits from a text message. In total, a DNMS message may utilize 236 bits, and 
will add the following data fields within the DNMS data: 
MSGID: The DNMS message identification is a code unique to an individual 
broadcast event. This code increments by 1 for each unique event that is programmed 
into the control segment chronologically, up to a maximum of 256 events, at which time 
the counter resets to 0 and begins counting again. This scheme minimizes the likelihood 
that two MSGID values overlap, under the assumption that in a 128 hour period (see 
DUR field), there will be fewer than 256 different events. The MSGID field serves one 
primary purpose: to uniquely identify an event and determine when an event’s 
information is updated and rebroadcast in order to associate multiple messages together. 
Of note, multiple messages with differing or like MSGIDs can be transmitted, ultimately 
supporting and providing information to the overarching disaster event. The MSG ID 
field uses 8 bits of the DNMS data stream to define the 256 event possibilities. 
ETYPE: The event type field in the DNMS message describes the category of 
disaster event, ultimately derived from the most common and impacting disaster events to 
since 1900 as shown in the CRED epidemiology report. This field has 16 possible states, 
utilizing 4 bits of the data stream.  Fifteen unique event types are defined in Table 5.  One 
additional data bit is available to be defined in future versions of ICD-GPS-705. In cases 
where multiple event types occur simultaneously, separate DNMS messages would be 
broadcast to allow flexibility and differentiation in event locations, areas and times, either 
through different or like MSGID fields. Optionally, in future versions of this type 44 L5 
message, the 4 ETYPE bits can be expanded to 16 using additional available bits such 
that each event utilizes a separate bit. This allows multiple simultaneous event types for 
the same overarching disaster, assuming all other message parameters are identical. For 
instance, if heat, drought and fire all occur at the same time, duration, location, etc, a 
single message could then be used instead of 3 separate messages. If however, the time, 
durations, locations or other fields vary, which is more often the case, the current ETYPE 
implementation scheme is more applicable.   
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Event Type Data Bits (4) 
Extreme Heat 0000 
Extreme Cold 0001 
Blizzard 0010 





Volcanic Eruption 1000 
Flooding / Storm Surge 1001 
Epidemic / Outbreak 1010 
Insect Infestation 1011 
Mass Earth Movement 1100 
Drought 1101 
Armed Conflict 1110 
Table 5.   ETYPE - DNMS Message Event Type 
PREC: The message precedence field is intended to allow multiple messages with 
the same MSGID number to be appropriately processed and interpreted by a receiver. 
Four different precedence levels are defined, as follows: 1) Original unmodified message 
broadcast, 2) All information fields are replaced with new message information for 
existing MS ID, 3) Information is added in aggregate to existing MSGID, 4) Disregard or 
cancel event MSGID prematurely. In cases where multiple differing messages are 
received (i.e., no original message but a field replacement message from one satellite and 
a field aggregation from another), the combination of event start and MSGID would be 
used to interpret the applicable data. Eventually with MSGID rollover it would be 
possible for ambiguities to exist, in which case the control system software would cancel 
the existing message and create a new original MSGID.   The control segment must be 
programmed in a way so as to not allow transmission of two messages with like MSGID 
fields, differing disaster details and inappropriate PREC field (i.e., Original Message).   
 
Event Precedence Data Bits (2) 
Original Message 00 
Field Replacement 01 
Field Aggregation 10 
Premature Cancellation 11 
Table 6.   PREC–DNMS Message Event Precedence 
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LOC: The LOC field is used in combination with the size, shape, ratio and 
direction fields to allow great flexibility and precision for a receiver to determine if the 
current PNT calculated position is within the geometric proximity of a disaster event. The 
location field translates to a World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS84) latitude and 
longitude and assumes that disaster events occur on the surface of the earth, or apply to 
all elevations at that latitude and longitude. The resolution of the location field is 
intended to be sub-10km. In defining the longitude value, based on the WGS84 defined 
earth radius at the equator of 6,378,137 m, using 1 bit to define west or east of the 
Greenwich meridian and 11 bits to define 2048 unique values counted to the west or east, 
the system resolution is 9.78 km. In defining the latitude, 1 bit is used to define 
north/south of the equator and 10 bits to define 1024 unique values counted to the north 
or south. In total, the LOC field utilizes 23 bits of the DNMS data message to arrive at 
any location on earth no more than approximately 3.13 km away (for worst case at 
equator). Note that due to the oblateness of Earth, the resolution is slightly higher fidelity 
at the polar north and south; latitude and longitude values at the pole will be no more than 
approximately 3.01 km away.     
SIZ: The size field is defined as the radius of the event from the center location 
defined by LOC in units of LOC resolution increments, as defined in Table 7. In cases 
where the SHP and RAT fields define different shapes than circles, the SIZ field denotes 
the radius equivalent from shape center to long axis shown in Figure 12. The SIZ field 
accommodates event sizes up to global, differentiating between 1024 LOC radius 
resolution value increments (~10,015 km) from center LOC as hemispherical and one 
additional bit state to represent a single global event. In an effort to minimize data bits 
used, a pseudo-logarithmic scale is implemented. With 16 unique values to define the 
event size, 4 bits of the DNMS message are used. 
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Table 7.   SIZE - DNMS Message Event Size 
SHP: The shape field of the DNMS message type specifies a circular or rectilinear 
base shape, utilizing a single bit of data.     
Event Shape Data Bit (1) 
Circular 0 
Rectilinear 1 
Table 8.   SHP–DNMS Message Event Shape 
RAT: The ratio field specifies the ratio of major and minor lengths of the shape 
defined by the SHP field. The ratio can be 1:1, 3:2, 5:2 or 5:1 utilizing 2 data bits. Figure 
12 shows the usable shape and ratio combinations, as well as size.   
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Figure 12.  DNMS Shape Ratio Examples 
 
 





Table 9.   RAT–DNMS Message Event Shape Ratio 
DIR: The direction field allows rotation of the shape in order to tailor to 
geographic region. Rotation is allowed through 8 states of 22.5 degree increments, 
utilizing 3 data bits as defined in Table 10. Due to shape symmetry, 1 data bit is saved in 
that 16 directional states need not be defined. In cases where SHP field denotes circle and 
RAT denotes a 1:1 axis ratio, the DIR field is defaulted to 0 degrees rotation and ignored 
by receivers.   
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Shape Direction Rotation Data Bits (3) 
N 0 degrees 000 
NNE 22.5 degrees 001 
NE 45 degrees 010 
ENE 67.5 degrees 011 
E 90 degrees 100 
ESE 112.5 degrees 101 
SE 135 degrees 110 
SSE 157.5 degrees 111 
Table 10.   DIR - DNMS Message Event Shape Direction 
 
Figure 13.  DNMS Shape Direction Example 
TIM: The time field defines the beginning time of the disaster event. Two pieces 
of information are used: the day of year in which the event starts being defined using 
GPS time as already calculated using other clock and ephemeris messages of the L5 
signal combined with the local receiver processing, and the number of 1 hour increments 
since the beginning of that Julian day. Note that because the maximum event duration 
(before rebroadcast) is one year as noted under DUR and constraints are placed on how 
far in advance messages can be transmitted, yearly ambiguities will not occur. 
Ambiguities can additionally be avoided by control segment constraints in defining new 
MSGIDs. Note also that the number of bits required to define a week number (6 bits) and 
hours into the week (8 bits), vice a day of year number (9 bits) and hours into the day (5 
bits) are identical at 14 bits. This scheme yields a time resolution of 1 hour.   
DUR: The event duration is defined as the time from the start of the disaster event 
until the forecast or predicted end. Disaster events can range in scale from minutes to 
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months or years; therefore the DUR field uses a pseudo-logarithmic scale as shown in 
Table 11. This scheme assumes a minimum duration of 1 hour, a maximum event 
duration of 1 year or 8760 hours, and a maximum time resolution of 1 hour. If an event 
spans beyond 1 year, a new DNMS message will be created and transmitted with 
identical DNMS MSGID, with new updated TIM and DUR, utilizing the precedence 
field, or re-creating the message itself as necessary.  Five data bits are utilized in defining 
duration states.   
Duration Duration Data Bits (5)  Duration Duration Data Bits (5) 
1 hr 1 hr 00000  96 hr 4 days 10000 
2 2 hrs 00001  120 5 days 10001 
3 3 hrs 00010  144 6 days 10010 
4 4 hrs 00011  192 8 days 10011 
5 5 hrs 00100  240 10 days 10100 
6 6 hrs 00101  480 20 days 10101 
7 7 hrs 00110  720 1 month 10110 
8 8 hrs 00111  1440 2 months 10111 
9 9 hrs 01000  2160 3 months 11000 
10 10 hrs 01001  2880 4 months 11001 
12 12 hrs 01010  3600 5 months 11010 
18 18 hrs 01011  4320 6 months 11011 
24 1 day 01100  5040 7 months 11100 
36 1.5 days 01101  5760 8 months 11101 
48 2 days 01110  6480 9 months 11110 
72 3 days 01111  8760 1 year 11111 
Table 11.   DUR–DNMS Message Event Duration 
LKL: The event likelihood field has 2 possible values of watch and warning, 
utilizing 1 bit of the data message. Broadcasted forecast events can be updated with like 
MSGID and appropriate PREC value to articulate the transition to an actual event 
occurring, from watch to warning.  
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Event Likelihood Data Bits (2) 
Watch: Event is probable but not yet observed 0 
Warning: Event is occurring 1 
Table 12.   LKL–DNMS Message Event Likelihood 
TXT: The text code field allows a significant number of pre-defined messages to 
be programmed into handsets, with localization provided in software through 
manufacturers for different languages and cultures, with the message intent defined in 
ICD-GPS-705. Only 21 individual messages are defined in Table 13, but 32 total bits are 
allocated for this function to allow additional text messages to be defined in the future. 
Bit 2 toggles on or off bits 3–5 of the 32 bits, which are coded for directional 
evacuations, whereas every other bit can be toggled in conjunction with other bits to 
allow for simultaneous messages within a single DNMS message. For instance, by 
combining bits 2, 4 and 11–13, a message could be sent directing to evacuate to the East 
while seeking higher elevations and rationing food and water; or by combining bits 8–12 
and 15, a message could be sent to immediately seek and reinforce shelter, avoid outdoor 
movement, to ration food and water and expect power outages. In the case of ‘outward’ 
evacuation, the handset has received the event center location and has calculated the 
current location through other messages and PNT data, and is able to calculate which 
direction is locally deemed ‘outward’. The text message is intended to be flexible to 
allow direction be provided in a wide range of scenarios.   
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Text Message Data Bits (32) 
Check Local Emergency Alerts 1-------------------------------
Evacuate (Directional) -1------------------------------
Evacuate to the North --000---------------------------
Evacuate to the North-East --001---------------------------
Evacuate to the East --010---------------------------
Evacuate to the South-East --011---------------------------
Evacuate to the South --100---------------------------
Evacuate to the South-West --101---------------------------
Evacuate to the West --110---------------------------
Evacuate to the North-West --111---------------------------
Evacuate Outward from Center -----1--------------------------
Evacuate (General) ------1-------------------------
Take Shelter Immediately -------1------------------------
Reinforce Shelter --------1-----------------------
Avoid Outdoor Movement ---------1----------------------
Ration Food ----------1---------------------
Ration Water -----------1--------------------
Seek Higher Elevations ------------1-------------------
Seek Lower Elevations -------------1------------------
Predicted Power Outages --------------1-----------------
Predicted Communication Outages ---------------1----------------
Table 13.   TXTCODE–DNMS Message Event Text Message Codes 
 
A single DNMS message, in total occupies 99 of the total 300 data bits. 
Subtracting overhead fields such as PRN or CRC, 137 bits remain unused. Two complete 
DNMS messages can occupy the same L5 message, so long as a single TRG trigger bit 
flags the second half of the message to be valid and processed by a receiver.  Thirty seven 
bits remain unused and available for future allocation or modification of the type 44 
DNMS message structure. Figure 14 shows the L5 type 44 message structure in total, 




Figure 14.  Refined L5 Message Type 44–DNMS Message 
Hurricane Sandy of October 2012 can be used as a case study of how multiple 
DNMS messages can be broadcast to satisfy requirements for a single natural disaster 
event. Hurricane Sandy broke land in the later stages of the storm system over Brigatine, 
NJ. While the effects of the hurricane were felt across approximately 24 states, it was 
considered most significant with severe damage and deaths in New Jersey and New York. 
In New York in particular, a storm surge was experienced that flooded streets, tunnels 
and subways. Substantial damage was incurred along the Atlantic coasts of both states 
with sustained power outages. As the storm’s predicted path approached the U.S. east 
coast, an initial DNMS message would have been broadcast with several days’ warning, 
as shown in the Figure 15 example. The initial message would have held enough 
information to alert that an incoming hurricane with deadly force was forecast to strike, 
and to direct individuals to take and reinforce shelter while avoiding outside movement, 
while expecting power outages and flooding. As the storm struck New Jersey and the 
storm surge began flooding New York, the original message could have been updated via 
precedence or a separate message transmitted warning of an actual hurricane, flooding 
and power outages also shown in the Figure 15 example. All messages are tailored 




Figure 15.  Overlapping Event Example (Shape, Ratio, Direction) 
It should be noted that while this case study only specifically addresses the impact 
of Hurricane Sandy on the United States, were this a real DNMS event, the hurricane’s 
progress and impact through the Caribbean would have been broadcast as well to report 
on a worldwide scale.   
D. DNMS CONTROL SEGMENT 
Similar to the GPS control segment, the DNMS control segment is responsible for 
the command and control of DNMS data, to include transmission to GPS satellites from 
worldwide ground antennas, receipt and functional verification of DNMS messages 
within the GPS signal from worldwide monitor stations, both through the GPS MCS, as 
well as communications with other disaster organizations.   
The Air Force Weather Agency (AFWA) headquartered in Offutt Air Force Base, 
Nebraska would adopt the lead DNMS command and control role as a military 
organization to interface with the GPS control segment, as well as to interface with a 
variety of international organizations responsible for aggregating and transmitting 
disaster notification information. The AFWA may or may not adopt the role of 
international command and control for disaster notification as depicted in Figure 6; as 
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such, the UN GDACS may optionally adopt the international command and control role 
and relay information to AFWA for transmission.  Figure 16 shows the information 
process flow from a variety of organizations to GPS users.   
 
Figure 16.  DNMS Control Segment Information Flow 
 
The primary communications protocol used in transporting disaster notification 
information to and through the DNMS control segment would be based on the CAP 
standard, through secured communication transmission lines. The AFWA would be 
responsible for receiving all alert information, filtering duplicate events from different 
organizations (i.e., UN and FEMA simultaneously report for the same event with minor 
variations in parameters should yield a single DNMS event), adding DNMS specific 
event fields and information in the XML format as a modified CAP standard, and 
relaying the success of event notification to source organizations as reported from the 
GPS MCS. Event information reported from AFWA to the GPS MCS must contain all 
required data to be transmitted as an L5 message type 44 - DNMS Message. Software at 
the GPS MCS will be largely automated and schedule satellite support contacts based 
upon priorities from AFWA. The GPS MCS will also have previously defined the 
required DNMS constellations to simplify the transmission process. The GPS MCS, 
dedicated ground antennas and AFSCN ground antennas are assumed to have adequate 
capacity of satellite contacts to support DNMS with necessary data uploads, as DNMS 
and PNT information can be uploaded in the same data sets.   
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E. DNMS USER SEGMENT 
The DNMS user segment consists of any device or user in receipt of a DNMS 
message through the L5 GPS signal. There is no specific design specification or 
implementation intended, rather the commercial industry is expected to integrate DNMS 
processing into devices. If necessary, local governments can mandate that GPS-enabled 
devices sold are able to process DNMS data, similar to U.S. mandates for mobile phones 
being IPAWS CMAS compliant.   
The most basic functionality of a DNMS receiver would be to report DNMS event 
information for an event in which the receiver is located. Advanced capabilities could 
include reporting disaster event information for other on-going events or past detected 
events, displaying disaster regions or evacuation routes on a map, displaying evacuation 
directions and alert information as an overlay to other device information and many, 
many more. The original design of GPS receivers simply calculated [primarily] latitude, 
longitude and elevation, but modern receivers display current locations on satellite 
imagery with real-time traffic overlays and turn-by-turn directions to destinations, etc; it 
is anticipated that similar commercialization and design innovation will inspire new ways 
to process and integrate DNMS data, so long as all receivers maintain basic functionality. 
One handset may simply process location and display alert information such as “Flooding 
in progress for your area, evacuate to the North-East,” etc, while another may display 
satellite imagery based map with evacuation route and traffic overlays. In either case 
however, the receiver is able to continually determine and re-determine if DNMS 
messages are applicable based upon the currently calculated GPS position. Utilizing the 
DNMS MSGID and PREC scheme, handsets are able to determine how to appropriately 
handle multiple messages or duplicate messages from the same or differing satellites.   
F. ADDITIONAL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Interference 
The suite of GPS signals is inherently susceptible to interference. Power levels for 
received signals at ground user equipment are generally lower than the background radio 
frequency noise; it is only due to correlation of DSSS that the signal itself can be 
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recovered and its data processed. Reports of interference for both civilian and military 
signals occur frequently, within the United States as well as abroad; most often this 
interference is inadvertent as uncorrelated noise bleeding into the GPS spectrum, but the 
sophistication of electronic warfare has increased in recent years such that adversaries are 
capable of more technically advanced attacks on GPS. Just as the miniaturization and 
proliferation of electronics brings GPS capabilities to individuals around the world, they 
also bring those same capabilities to adversaries. As an electronic warfare axiom goes, 
“The day the first transmitter was invented, so too was the first jammer.” 
In early 2013, a team from MIT with the cooperation of a witting yacht crew 
performed a proof of concept navigation attack as if a malicious attacker were spoofing 
GPS. GPS signals were slowly overpowered with a compilation of artificial signals which 
successfully steered the yacht 100 miles off course, and then followed a parallel track to 
the original course, all while the on-board navigation systems and other systems 
dependent upon GPS reported the location on the original track (Saarinen, 2013). The 
sophistication of attacks on GPS has increased exponentially in recent years, and DNMS 
data inserted into the GPS signals is also inherently susceptible. Also occurring in early 
2013, computer hackers interfered with a television based emergency broadcast system in 
northern Michigan by reporting to and alerting the public that a zombie apocalypse was 
underway (Huffington Post, 2013). This highlights the susceptibility of emergency 
broadcast systems. Had the attackers intended malicious or nefarious effects, they could 
have synchronized attacks with other emergency broadcast systems and used more subtle 
and realistic alerts to cause mayhem. Emergency broadcast systems and GPS based 
electronic systems are constantly tested for vulnerabilities and exploited when available. 
If DNMS data is broadcast, it is extremely probable that it will not take long before 
spoofed disaster notification broadcasts are received by users.   
It is likely that precluding such attacks on DNMS is impossible, but there are 
steps that could be taken either technologically, procedurally or according to policy in 
order to make them less likely; unfortunately, each step has significant effects on the 
design and operation of the system as a whole. The L5 SoL signal already exists in a 
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more protected portion of the EM spectrum than other GPS signals, but it is still 
susceptible to interference.   
One option to prevent malicious spoofing is to utilize encryption or a type of 
coded or authenticated rule-sets similar to parity. In order for encryption to work 
however, keys must be distributed to users via some data transfer mechanism wherein 
keys would not be available to an adversary of this system. Key distribution on this scale 
is unlikely. Message authentication via rule-sets or checksum is possible, similar to the 
way parity or checksums in credit card or IMEI numbers operate, such as Luhn, Verhoeff 
or Damm algorithms. For instance in the case of credit cards, it is statistically improbable 
that randomly choosing 16 base 10 numbers will yield a potentially operational credit 
card number; there are certain rules in place to ensure every number is provided by a card 
distributor error free. For this scheme of authentication to work however, those rules 
must be safeguarded as if they were an encryption key, otherwise an adversary may 
create numbers which abide by those rules and spoof a legitimate signal. In this scheme, 
receivers would require the rules be coded and stored locally in order to detect 
authenticated signals; were the rules to remain concealed, it is still possible to use a 
compromised receiver to brute force and discover authenticated codes for exploitation. In 
both cases, additional bandwidth for the encryption key or authentication key is required 
which reduces the overall bandwidth of the DNMS system. The more complicated the 
key or rule-sets, the fewer DNMS messages can be transmitted. Ultimately, no 
technological system can be created that is impervious to reverse engineering or attack.   
Another option is to utilize international policy and law in order to deter such 
attacks on DNMS. Attacks on GPS signals most commonly occur from terrestrial based 
transmitters (vice airborne or spaceborne) where approximate geo-location is possible. 
By using international policy in cooperation with local and cooperating law enforcement 
in the countries affected by said interference, perpetrators can be searched for, potentially 
arrested and tried in a court of law. The United Nations may provide a framework for 
such international policy. Numerous articles of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights would be violated by such an attack, depending upon the attack’s severity and 
intention. Not all countries, including the United States, have signed many United 
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Nations policies or protocols, so finding a standard baseline of policy would be difficult. 
Another option in international policy is to use relationships the United States shares with 
other nation states directly. DNMS is provided by the United States with the cooperation 
of local, regional or national reporting nodes. Agreements would need to be in place 
between the United States and other nation states that persons or organizations 
intentionally interfering with DNMS be prosecuted under the full extent of local and 
international law, in order for the DNMS service to be provided and for events within 
those national boundaries to be reported. Unlike PNT data transmitted through GPS 
signals, DNMS data could be manipulated by the United States in a way so as to not 
report events that occur within certain geographic boundaries. These actions would likely 
deter most, but ultimately not prevent some, attacks.   
2. Additional Modernized GPS Signals 
Other modernized GPS signals, such as the L1C, L2C or military only M-code 
have the same potential for underutilized bandwidth and the same the same message 
based construct that the L5 signal has. Modifying the GPS ICDs, control segment and 
space segment to accommodate DNMS on the L5 signal, and making the requisite policy 
changes to institute a disaster notification system over GPS represent the majority of 
obstacles and required changes in order to support other modernized signals. The 
relationship of data flow between signals is the major design decision that would need to 
be addressed. The data can either be replicated and broadcast across all DNMS capable 
signals to ensure receipt, in which case no additional bandwidth is available from the 
additional signals but would reach a receiver regardless of which modernized signal is 
utilized, or different messages can be broadcast on different signals, which would force 
receivers to track and process data for all modernized signals in order to ensure receipt of 
a message and utilize a more significant portion of the total available bandwidth. The 
question ultimately depends upon how adequately the L5 only DNMS bandwidth is able 
to account for disaster messages, and how receiver manufacturers design receivers.   
By simultaneously transmitting data on all 3 modernized civilian signals as 
parallel transmission on different channels, the data can effectively be multiplexed to 
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allow 4 times, the bandwidth so long as users receive all channels. With one additional 
channel, the bandwidth could be increased to 8 times, etc, however in this scheme, if a 
single channel is not tracked, no data is able to be processed.   
When considering the military M-code as an additional modernized signal to 
include DNMS data upon, it is important to also consider what differences in data would 
be present between the civilian and military signals. Similar to the potential difference of 
civilian C/A and military P(Y) PNT data on legacy signals, a potential exists to tailor 
DNMS data for military forces, while still providing baseline support for worldwide use. 
This option would utilize more of the overall available bandwidth, and could provide 
higher fidelity tailored messaging for areas of military operations.  
3. Commercialization of DNMS Data 
Using different signals, encryption, authentication schemes or controlling 
geographic boundaries can allow the control segment to control DNMS message receipt 
to different user groups. The United States and the Russian Federation both utilize 
encryption to control data flow between civilian and military user groups for GPS and 
GLONASS GNSS respectively. The Galileo GNSS is an example of a system where, by 
controlling information flow, the civilian PNT data is commercialized wherein differing 
levels of service yield differing performance levels. The GPS DNMS could be 
commercialized at two different and mutually exclusive levels: national or individual 
service. Either method to commercialize would have significant implications on the 
design of GPS DNMS, and the level of international support the system would receive.   
Similar to using international law and policy combined with the threat of 
discontinued service to garner nation state support, the service itself could be controlled 
to only report events within a country that provides to the United States government an 
annual minimal service fee. While unlikely, the cost of modifying the GPS and the 
sustained costs of operations would be balanced evenly in a sustainable way. One option 
of balancing costs is to prorate based on a nation’s GDP in order to allow access for poor 
or rich nations. It is vital that the DNMS service scheme utilized not be priced in a way to 
as to be cost prohibitive to any nation. 
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The second option is to use encryption to allow DNMS messages be received only 
by paying customers, or to split between a baseline free level of service and an increased 
level of service which the United States government would be contractually obligated to 
provide. The cost of modifying the GPS and the sustained costs of operating would be 
balanced evenly in a sustainable way. The negative consequences of bandwidth 
occupation and cryptographic key distribution processes apply. Also as noted in the 
national level scheme, it is vital that the DNMS service not be priced in a way so as to be 
cost prohibitive to any individual.   
4. WAAS 
GPS satellites are not the only satellites which transmit GPS data. GPS Wide Area 
Augmentation Service (WAAS) satellites operated by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) act as a satellite based augmentation system (SBAS) to transmit 
real-time clock, ephemeris and ionospheric corrections to GPS PNT data over north 
America, intending to provide accuracy equivalent to Category 1 ILS primarily for 
aviation use (FAA, 2013). The data is transmitted in 5-second increments on GPS PRNs 
other than those defined in the operational GPS ICDs, and commercial equipment 
manufacturers have designed high performance handsets and receivers to utilize the 
additional correction information in order to provide significantly improved performance. 
Similarly, on an international scale, the European Space Agency has implemented the 
European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) which provides real-time 
corrections to the GPS, GLONASS and Galileo GNSSs primarily for aviation use over 
the European Union and Africa. Many other SBASs exist.   
Combining WAAS, EGNOS or other SBASs with DNMS data may provide an 
effective augmentation or link replacement to DNMS. SBASs to include WAAS and 
EGNOS are generally broadcast from geostationary satellites, which has several benefits 
for broadcast signals. Based on the geostationary orbit, only ~3–4 satellites total are 
required for continuous near worldwide coverage (limited coverage at polar north and 
south without additional satellites). Additionally, because the relative satellite position 
 54
remains comparatively static in the sky, updated data can be transmitted and received 
continuously in near real-time without changes in visibility.   
One major advantage to utilizing SBASs is that DNMS data can be inserted on 
one or many PRNs newly created and dedicated to the DNMS mission. These PRNs 
would be broadcast at the same GPS SPS frequency (legacy signal) and received by 
WAAS capable receivers. New dedicated PRNs continuously broadcasting DNMS data 
would dramatically increase the bandwidth of the overall system. Additionally, using 
WAAS or other SBASs as the primary DNMS data link would greatly simplify the 
operational communication schemes and timelines.   
Another option to further simplify the DNMS design is to create one or many 
PRNs and transmit DNMS data through commercially leased transponder space. This 
scheme would require a central command and control location, 3–4 ground transmission 
sites, and leased transponder space on 3–4 geosynchronous satellites. The FAA has 
previously tested and provided WAAS correction data on commercially leased 
transponder space on INMARSAT-4 F3 (FAA, 2013). These newly created PRNs would 
also be broadcast at the same GPS frequency. Under this scheme, the existing GPS 
control and space segments do not require modification and ultimately the overall cost of 
implementing the DNMS system is significantly reduced. Response timeliness also has 
the potential to increase using SBAs, wherein a continuous data link is established. Under 
the current GPS control segment paradigm, a connection must be established in real-time, 
occupying precious minutes that otherwise could have been used to alert individuals. 
Also worth considering is that because the WAAS corrections exist on GPS frequencies, 
it is not in the protected spectrum space of L5 and is potentially more prone to 
inadvertent interference. Leasing commercial transponder space for a PRN based GPS 
SBAS ultimately has significant potential for DNMS, with many benefits.   
5. GPS Emergency Messaging System Patents 
In January of 2010, U.S. patent number US7650136 B2 was published as a 
continuation to U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/268,096 filed in October of 2002, 
wherein emergency messaging data is superimposed onto GPS signals. The patent 
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includes information on the modification of the GPS segments in order to “…enable 
distribution of emergency messages nationally and globally while minimizing investment 
in new infrastructure … tailored to geographic region …” (Schnabel, 2010). While this 
patent differs in many implementation details and has different areas emphasized in 
specificity, the core functionality is essentially the same: each has response centers or 
aggregating nodes at various levels, a GPS control segment responsible for transmission 
to satellites, GPS satellites capable of transmitting disaster information, and users capable 
of receiving disaster information. Thorough legal reviews must be accomplished to 
determine the consequences existing patents have on DNMS implementation.   
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IV. GPS POLICY 
The GPS has become a ubiquitous utility; with each added capability, feature or 
upgrade and with increasing infrastructure dependence, the system and all space 
capabilities have become inherently intertwined in policy and lawmaking decisions and 
strategies from the national and international level, down to United States military 
operations. The DNMS augmentation to the GPS must abide by existing policy, and as 
currently theorized, does.  
The National Security Strategy (NSS) signed by President Barack Obama in May 
2010 highlights the need to continue growth of indigenous space capabilities, and to 
continue investing in the research and development of next-generation technologies and 
capabilities to benefit commercial, civil and other communities to maintain the viability 
of space for future generations. Additionally, the strategy declares that the space domain 
is a shared area that exists outside exclusive national jurisdictions and is “…the 
connective tissue around our globe upon which all nations’ security and prosperity 
depend” (Obama, 2010). The DNMS would be, like GPS, a connective tissue of which all 
nations depend upon and prosper from.   
The GPS is guided by the National Security Presidential Directive #39, December 
2004, as well in which then President George Bush acknowledges the criticality of GPS 
on multiple sectors of the U.S. infrastructure. President Bush also directed that PNT 
infrastructure be modernized to deploy new public safety services when required, and to 
the maximum extent practical (Obama, 2004).  The DNMS would not interfere with the 
existing or future planned PNT data used by critical infrastructures, and would in fact add 
public safety services fostering international cooperation and goodwill.   
The NSS Space supplement, the National Security Space Strategy, released by 
then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in January 2011, also highlights that space is 
vital in order to enable the viability of the global economy. The DNMS would have the 
ability to spark worldwide manufacturing of localized GPS enabled devices, in addition 
to those already being incorporated into existing devices manufactured throughout the 
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world. Additionally, Robert Gates said: “We will explore sharing space-derived 
information as ‘global utilities’ with partnered nations. As we do today with the 
positioning, navigation, and timing services of the Global Positioning System, we will 
provide services derived from selected space systems and enhance those services through 
partnerships [with other responsible nations]” (Gates, 2011). An opportunity exists for 
collaboration and partnership with other nations not yet seen.   
The National Space Policy of June 2010 has a stated goal to: “Expand 
international cooperation on mutually beneficial space activities to broaden and extend 
the benefits of space [and] further the peaceful use of space …” (Obama, 2010). The U.S. 
will enable others to share the benefits provided by the use of space; in that, the DNMS 
excels.   
Being operated by the Department of Defense, the GPS is also inherently guided 
by defense strategy. In the National Defense Strategy, signed in June 2008 by then 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, it is acknowledged that “…global prosperity is 
contingent on the free flow of ideas, goods, and services” (Gates, 2008). The National 
Military Strategy also supports the DNMS in that all domains (air, space, cyberspace, etc) 
allow for high-speed, high-volume exchange of ideas, information and capital, among 
other things, that are critical to the global economy (Mullen, 2011). 
The Department of Defense Directive 4650.05, signed February 2008 which 
guides Position Navigation and Timing does not explicitly support an augmentation such 
as DNMS, but the guidance is specific to PNT information, not the GPS as an 
all-encompassing entity and the DNMS does not interfere with the PNT guidance 




V. CONCLUSIONS  
The GPS has potential as an effective communication link to add critical capacity 
and reach to global disaster notification broadcast systems. This GPS augmentation 
system can be tied to other worldwide disaster aggregation and reporting systems and 
organizations with minimal costs, and be provided as a free utility without affecting the 
ability and capacity to continue providing PNT data. As an added data link, this system 
could remove many obstacles to reaching those affected by disasters, such as cell phone 
carriers, numerous other data links, delays, geographic reach, economic viability, et al.   
Adequate bandwidth capacity exists in the planned L5 SoL GPS signal to provide 
notifications for the more than 200 million individuals currently affected by disasters 
annually, given some limitations and assumptions regarding notification trigger criteria. 
Some limitations in this GPS augmentation exist in overall system capacity and 
timeliness. Not every disaster where an individual is killed can be reported while still 
maintaining capacity such that the PNT data resident in the GPS signal remains 
unaffected. Similarly, given the existing control segment infrastructure and the 
notification timelines of some natural disaster events such as earthquakes or tsunamis, 
limitations exist in the system’s overall effectiveness. The system as designed however 
meets the requirements outlined in section III.A, and has potential to provide notifications 
for the vast majority of disaster events and affected individuals.   
For this system to be realized, the United States must accept ownership as well as 
implementation and service costs. National level policy through military strategy must 
account for the role and associated responsibilities the United States would accept by 
introducing such a system. Ultimately, through relatively minimal costs, the United States 
could provide additional capacity to worldwide disaster notification services saving many 
lives. Additionally, international partnerships, cooperation and prosperity would be 
fostered, while furthering the peaceful uses of space.   
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VI. RECOMMENDED AREAS OF FURTHER STUDY  
Augmenting the GPS to provide disaster notification services offers new 
capability; however, throughout this analysis many assumptions were made and many 
areas exist which require further study before final DNMS design decisions can be made.   
More refined natural disaster epidemiology data needs to be analyzed in order to 
more accurately drive worldwide notification system requirements; specifically, 
geographic size, dispersion and statistical distribution need to be refined in order to 
ensure adequate system capacity and capability.   
ICDs currently exist for all planned future GPS signals; however implementation 
plans are extremely limited in the control, space and user GPS segments. Accurate 
control segment specifics such as system automation, processing capacity, and 
communication timeliness; space segment specifics such as data processing, memory, 
broadcast message timelines, and satellite cross-linking capabilities; and user segment 
specifics such as all-in-view data processing, ‘cold-start’ signal tracking timeliness, and 
many others for all segments remain largely unknown. For all GPS segments and for all 
modernized GPS signals, phased implementation plans are needed.   
A detailed software simulation of the ad-hoc satellite tasking transmission scheme 
mentioned as option 2 in paragraph III.C.2 needs to be pursued. This transmission 
method has potential to increase available bandwidth of the DNMS system, though it 
adds real-time planning and computational complexity.   
All areas of additional design considerations need to be refined. The performance 
of the L5 signal and its ‘protected’ nature against inadvertent, intentional white and 
spoofed interference must be tested in laboratory and real world with ground and airborne 
assets. The WAAS consideration of DNMS through commercially leased GEO 
SATCOM needs to be further explored and refined as well, as it offers many significant 
advantages to the implementation of DNMS. Additionally, thorough legal reviews of 
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